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Abstract Using a reformulation of conventional results in decoherence theory, a condition is proposed for
singling out a distinguished class of histories which includes those which use the “pointer basis” of Zurek.
1. What’s good and bad about consistent histories
The basic problem faced by any extension of quantum theory outside the laboratory realm of Bohr’s in-
terpretation can be expressed by the slogan (Giulini et al., 1996) “how does the classical world emerge?”
Unpacking the meaning of “classical world” we can extract several interlinked problems:
1. How is it that the logic of propositions about macroscopic objects is classical (that is, a Boolean
lattice) whereas the logic of quantum propositions is an orthocomplemented lattice (Beltrametti &
Cassinelli, 1981)?
2. Where the classical behaviour is, as a consequence of underlying quantum processes, indeterministic,
then
(a) what determines the particular Boolean sub-lattice of quantum states that can be ex-
pressed as corresponding classical states (why does the Schro¨dinger’s cat Gedankenexper-
iment have the result that we believe it would have)?
(b) how is the statistical mechanics of these probabilistically chosen classical states derived
from the dynamics of quantum theory?
(c) on each individual occurrence, what determines which one of the classically allowed states
is in fact actualised?
3. When the classical behaviour is (at least to a high accuracy) deterministic, how is the classical
dynamics derived from the quantum dynamics?
I would claim that, apart from Bohm’s interpretation, which relies on intrinsically unobservable hidden
variables, and interpretations involving essentially new and untested physics, existing interpretations can
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solve 2b and 3 in many situations, but can only partially solve the others. The consistent histories approach
(Omne`s, 1999a; Giulini et al., 1996) has proceeded futhest with resolving these problems, and has done so in
a way that introduces the minimum of controversional ontological scafolding (many worlds etc). I want to
propose a modification of the histories approach that solves 1 and 2a more satisfactorily. 2c remains a problem
for me, and for versions of the histories approach other than that of (Omne`s, 1999b), who deconstructs the
question on metaphysical grounds.
Attempts to solve 1 and 2a rest (as does 2b) on the phenomenon of decoherence which ensures that a
statistical ensemble of macroscopic systems linked to microscopic states, all initially prepared in the same
state, will as a result of environmental influences, evolve to an ensemble described by a density matrix that
is almost exactly diagonal in a basis (the pointer basis, Zurek, 1981; Giulini et al., 1996) adapted to the
distinct classical states of the macroscopic system. This leaves two unresolved difficulties, however, which I
will justify shortly:
A. The consistency condition used by the histories programme (see (2) below) in fact implies, tau-
tologously without any physics, that the histories obey classical logic (in the sense of satisfying
probability sum rules: see Dowker and Kent (1996) eqn (2.5)). Thus 1 is not being solved by a
physical explanation, but is in effect just being put in “by hand.”
B. Even if we accept the consistency condition, which forces a Boolean lattice, how do we know that
there is not some other Boolean lattice, in addition to that defined by macroscopically distinguish-
able states, which still satisfies the consistency condition? If that were the case, then the consistency
condition would not determine the lattice of classical states and 2a would not be solved.
Both these problems are of physical interest; for, if we could clearly articulate physical conditions under which
a unique Boolean lattice emerged in the quantum limit, then it would become of great interest, and would
be theoretically grounded, to look for areas where there were slight departures from a Boolean lattice. Some
aspects of biology might provide evidence of such areas (Ho, 1998). Point B rests (i) on the circumstances
that no rigorous mathematical proof exists of the uniqueness of the pointer basis in generating a classical
logic, and (ii) on the demonstration by Dowker and Kent (1996) that, both in specific examples and in
general on dimension-counting grounds, this basis is not unique. The latter argument is not cast-iron, since
it could be that special symmetries invalidate the general dimension-counting arguments; but the onus is
now on those who claim uniqueness of the pointer basis to demonstrate it rigorously. Point A, however,
provides the main focus of this paper
2. Consistent histories and the stability condition
The consistent histories formalism
I assume here that we are dealing with conventional quantum mechanics over a given Hilbert space H. The
version of the histories formalism that I am using here is taken from Dowker and Kent (1996) except that
my notation interchanges their sub- and superscripts. This version is not explicitly relativistic, but I do not
regard this as essential for the point being made here.
A history set is a pair H = (ρ, (σ1, σ2, . . . , σn)) for some n where
ρ is a density matrix (unit trace non-negative Hermitean operator on H)
for each i, σi = (P
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Note that through these conditions we are putting in by hand the classicality of the propositions for any one
instant, but we are not demanding it overall in the way that the different σi relate to each other.
A history belonging to H is a sequence H = (P1, . . . , Pn) with Pi ∈ σi for all i and the probability of H in
the initial state ρ is given by
P(ρ;H) := Tr(Pn . . . P1ρP1 . . . Pn). (1)
The consistency condition on H in its strongest form (the arguments given above also apply to many of the
weaker forms) is that
Tr(P
(n)
in
. . . P
(1)
i1
ρP
(1)
j1
. . . P
(n)
jn
) = δi1j1 . . . δinjnP(ρ; (P
(1)
i1
, . . . P
(n)
jn
)). (2)
The stability condition
This condition is based on the well known distinction (see, for example, the survey in Tegmark, 2000)
between the dynamical timescale td and the decoherence timescale tdc for a system. The dynamical time
scale is determined by the system Hamiltonian, independently of the environment; whereas both are involved
in decoherence. Dynamical timescales can vary widely: for human experience, based on neuronal firing rates,
this might be 10−3s, for cosmology in the present era 1015s and for electon-positron pair production (where the
logic would be highly non-classical) 10−20s. The principle of the stability condition is that the probabilities
for histories should not vary (as a function of the timing of their propositions) on a timescale (the stability
timescale) that is very much less than the dynamical timescale td. We cannot, for instance, claim to be
talking about human experience and then introduce a proposition whose probability changes on a timescale
of 10−10s. It is straight forward (see §3 below) to see that the probabilities for “unphysical” propositions
(referring, for example, to superposed states of the human brain) vary on the decoherence timescale, and so
this condition does precisely what is required.
This proposal still has an air of the ad hoc about it, and needs to be related to a more fundamental theory. But
it is, unlike the consistency condition, non-trivial (in the sense of point A, that it does not beg the question
it is trying to solve) and is sufficiently grounded physically to point the way to a correct fundamental theory.
The rest of the paper is devoted to spelling out in more detail how this operates in practice.
We consider a situation where we are examining the effect of a proposition P posed after a subhistory
H(i) = (P1, . . . , Pi) with an initial state of ρ. Thus we are concerned with P(ρ;H
(i), P ). Now let Pt denote
the proposition obtained by evolving P for time t, namely
Pt := exp(iHt/h¯)P exp(−iHt/h¯). (3)
Then we define the repetition probability by
p(t) := P(ρ;H(i), P, Pt). (4)
Note that p(0) > p(t) for t > 0.
We can now define the (repetition) stability timescale ts for P in this context. The idea is elementary but
its formulation rather tedious; again, an indication that the theory cannot be in any sense fundamental. We
want to define the stability timescale as the inverse of the gradient of p(t) near t = 0 (more precisely: the
slope of the chord from t = 0 to a suitable point). Unfortunately, p(t) may be subject to small fluctuations
due to perturbations from background noise (of a normal physical kind unconnected with decoherence)
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which could give rise to large gradients on a very small timescale. We define the magnitude of these possible
fluctuations away from t = 0 by setting
V (t, c) := sup
t≤t1<t2≤td
t2−t1≥c
|p(t2)− p(t1)|
t2 − t1
(5)
Then let F be the ratio of the slope of the chord from t = 0 to the slope of the following fluctuations:
F (t) :=
p(0)− p(t)
t
/
V (t, t) (6)
having a supremum of F ∗, and let t∗ be the smallest point (it exists!) for which
lim sup
t→t∗
F (t) = F ∗. (7)
The stability timescale is then the inverse slope of the chord to t∗:
ts :=
t∗
p(0)− p(t∗)
. (8)
The stability condition is then the requirement on each σi that ts > λtd where λ is some chosen small
parameter.
3. Stability and decoherence
This section fills in the obvious connection between stability and decoherence, showing that as a result of the
latter, the stabiity condition rules out superpositions of macroscopically distinct states, and thus gives rise to
a Boolean lattice. Decoherence involves the setting where H = HE⊗HS where S refers to the system and E
to the environment. It is hard to give a completely general formulation of the results concerning decoherence
and the pointer basis (see Giulini et al., 1996); but a model of the idea sufficient for our purposes might be
the proposition that each σi can be chosen so that
(a) For all k, RangeP
(i)
k = HE ⊗ V
(i)
k for a subspace V
(i)
k of HS
(b) If |e〉 ∈ V
(i)
k and |f〉 ∈ V
(i)
l for k 6= l, then 〈e|ρS |f〉 → 0 in the decoherence timescale, where ρS is
the density matrix projected to HS by tracing over environment variables.
Consider, then, the possibility of measuring a projection on a superposition |k〉 = a|e〉 + b|f〉 (i.e. a “live
cat + dead cat” situation) with |a|2 + |b|2 = 1. Thus let P = |k〉〈k|. Let ρ′ = H(i)T ρH(i) where T denotes
transpose. Then from (4)
p(t) = TrPtPρ
′PPt. (9)
The effective density matrix following P , projected onto the system variables, is
ρ∗ :=
(
Pρ′P
p(0)
)
S
. (10)
This is a unit trace matrix proportional to |k〉〈k|, and hence is equal to |k〉〈k| ( = P ), the non-zero terms,
in a basis containing |e〉 and |f〉 being
ρ∗ ∼
[
|a|2 ab¯
a¯b |b|2
]
. (11)
The off-diagonal terms decay with the decoherence time tdc, while the diagonal terms are stable and so from
(9) and (10), noting that tracing over the environment commutes with P (but not with H)
p(t) = p(0)[ a b ]
[
|a|2 ǫ
ǫ |b|2
] [
a¯
b¯
]
(12)
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where |ǫ| ∼ e−t/tdc . Thus
p(t)→ p(0)(|a|4 + |b|4) = p(0)(1− 2|a|2|b|2).
This will violate the stability condition unless either |a| or |b| is very small, that is, unless the superposition
is very close to a pure macroscopic state, as required.
4. Conclusion
I have stressed that this is a provisional theory with ad hoc elements. There seems to be a growing feeling
among some workers (e.g. Zeh, 2000) that the inadequacies of the current situation can only be overcome by a
theory of mind; a view that I would endorse, though without thereby endorsing a many-minds metaphysics.
There remains, however, a considerable gap between approaches to a theory of mind starting from the
requirements of quantum theory (e.g. Donald, 1995) and those starting from psychology (e.g. Velmans,
2000). Work under way to bridge this gap (e.g. Clarke, 2000) still needs to develop an adequate dynamics;
but the requirement of a stability condition can now be used to provide a clear goal in this work.
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